In the last few years we have used ALECSYS, a parallel learning classifier system based on the genetic algorithm, to develop behavioral modules for mobile robots, both simulated and real. In this paper we briefly report on our experience, and then reflect on various concepts stemming from the application of evolutionary computation to agent building. We propose a definition of agent, analyze the relationships holding between an agent and its external environment, and discuss some important similarities and differences between natural and artificial systems; in particular, we compare the concept of fitness of an organism with that of quality of an artifact. We then concentrate on adaptation, regarded as a basic process for the development of both biological organisms and artificial agents. We carry on our analysis trying to understand where and how Behavior Engineering (i.e., the discipline concerned with the development of artificial agents) might profit from the use of evolutionary strategies. We argue that an evolutionary approach might allow us to search the space of nonrational design, thus opening a whole new world of possibilities for the implementation of artificial systems.
Introduction
In the late fifties, computer scientists started to work on the project -known as Artificial Intelligence (AI) -of building intelligent computational systems. The basic assumption underlying most work in AI is that intelligence, either natural or artificial, intrinsically is a computational phenomenon, and therefore can be studied in disembodied systems, that is, in systems that have a "mind" but no "body" (with the exception of their computing "brain").
Forty years later, it is widely believed that -in spite of impressive local successes -AI will find it very difficult to reach its ultimate goal. Feeling unable to implement disembodied environment, and behavior. We then consider the possible import on BE of basic biological concepts, like function and fitness. We shall not forget that BE, like any other engineering field, must look at its object -behavior -as a product, and shall therefore try to establish a notion of behavior quality.
In Section 4 we discuss adaptation as a basic process of agent development, considering both ontogenetic and philogenetic adaptation.
In Section 5 we take up the idea of building complex agents through artificial evolution. We analyze the notion of modularity as a basic component of rational design, and discuss the feasibility of using evolutionary computation as a means to search the space of nonrational design.
Our concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
The ALECSYS Experience
In the last few years, we have been experimenting on the application of evolutionary strategies to the development of agents, both in simulation and in the real environment. In our experiments, evolution is limited to behavioral components: both hardware and software architectures are designed, and do not evolve. In the following we describe the types of agents, environments and behaviors we have considered, the development tool we have used, and the experiments we have run.
AutonoMice and other robots
In our experiments, we have been inspired by Wilson's animat problem (Wilson, 1987) , that is, the problem of having an artificial agent survive in the real world. Therefore, our robot are somewhat zoomorphic, and inhabit environments containing preys, predators, nests, etc.
Although we have run a fair number of experiments in simulated environments, in this paper we shall briefly describe only the experimentation carried out with real robots. The interested reader is referred to (Dorigo & Schnepf, 1993; Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994a; Dorigo, 1995; Colombetti, Dorigo & Borghi, 1996) for more details. We have used four different robots, that we call AutonoMouse II, AutonoMouse V, HAMSTER and CRAB. They all perform their activity in rooms and corridors, containing various kinds of obstacles, preys (light sources or colored objects), areas designated as nests, etc.
The AutonoMice are small mobile robots built for experimental purposes at our research Lab. AutonoMouse II (Figure 2 .1) has four directional eyes and two motors. Each directional eye can sense a light source within a cone of about 60 degrees. Each motor can stay still or move the connected wheel one or two steps forwards, or one step backwards. The robot is connected to a transputer board on a PC via a 9600-baud RS-232 link. Only a small amount of processing is done on-board (i.e., the collection of data from sensors and to actuators and the management of communications with the PC); learning algorithms run on the transputer board.
AutonoMouse V (Figure 2 .2) has two directional eyes, a front sonar, front and side whiskers, a "change of direction" sensor (which we call a tail), and tracks moved by two motors. Each directional eye can sense a light source within a cone of about 180 degrees. The two eyes together cover a 270 degrees zone, with an overlapping of 90 degrees in front of the robot.
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The sonar is highly directional and can sense an object as far as 10 meters. Each motor can stay still or move the connected track one or two steps forwards, or one step backwards. AutonoMouse V is linked to a transputer board on a PC via a 4800-baud infra-red link. HAMSTER (Figure 2 .3) is a mobile robot based on Robuter, a commercial platform produced by RoboSoft. It is 102 cm long, 68 cm wide and 44 cm high. The configuration we used has a belt of 24 Polaroid sonars, surrounding the whole platform. Motion is produced by two motors acting on two independent wheels. HAMSTER uses a frontal color camera to identify the position of certain colored objects in the environment (food pieces and the nest). Moreover, it exploits an odometer (that is, a sensor that estimates the robot's position and heading), to approximately identify the position of the nest when this is not visible. A PC hosting a transputer board is carried on board. 
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CRAB ( Figure 2 .4) is a robotic arm based on a two-link industrial manipulator, an IBM 7547 with a SCARA geometry. The first link can rotate 200 degrees around the shoulder joint, and the second link can rotate 160 degrees, with respect to the first link, around the elbow joint. As a result the end effector, attached to the wrist, can cover the gray area shown in Figure  2 .5. The actuators are two motors, acting on the shoulder and the elbow joints, that respectively rotate the first link (with respect to the fixed base) and the second link (with respect to the first link). More details on the robots and their environments will be given in Section 2.3.
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ALECSYS as a tool for agent development
ALECSYS is a distributed learning classifier system (LCS) that we have used to implement the learning control systems of our AutonoMice. The basic component of ALECSYS is a LCS, as depicted in Figure 2 .6. A LCS is composed of three interacting systems: the performance system, a kind a production rule system which is in charge of directing the behavior of the controlled agent; the apportionment of credit system, which is in charge, by means of an algorithm called Bucket Brigade (Holland, 1980) , of evaluating the usefulness of rules used by the performance system; and the genetic algorithm, whose duty is to discover new useful rules to be added to the knowledge base used by the performance system 1 . In our approach to the development of control systems by LCSs, which we call robot shaping (Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994a) , the interaction between the agent controlled by the LCS and its environment is observed by a trainer which provides step-by-step (i.e., immediate) reinforcements: rewards when the agent does something correct, punishments when the agent does something wrong. 
LCS
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In ALECSYS a single LCS can be parallelized on a transputer network. 2 This allows one to increase the complexity of behaviors which can be learned by a single LCS. Moreover, ALECSYS allows for the distribution of a set of LCSs on a transputer network, so that we can have more LCSs cooperating to learn to solve a complex task. In fact, the basic idea underlying the ALECSYS system is that complex learning problems can be attacked by decomposition into simpler problems: each simpler problem is then given as a learning task to a, possibly parallelized, LCS. Though this divide et impera approach is not a new idea in software design, we were among the first (Dorigo & Sirtori, 1991; Mahadevan & Connell, 1992; Dorigo & Schnepf, 1993; Lin, 1993) to combine the behavioral decomposition approach (Brooks, 1991) with reinforcement learning techniques. We will discuss in the following Section 5 some of the limits of this approach and will suggest that evolutionary techniques could be better exploited to develop "nonrational" solutions to the problem of designing the control architecture of an autonomous agent. As we said, by using ALECSYS we can define a certain number of communicating LCSs: each LCS can implement either a basic behavioral module, or a coordination behavioral module. For example, in a FollowPrey + AvoidObstacles task, we can use three LCSs: one for the basic FollowPrey behavior, one for the basic AvoidObstacles behavior, and one for the behavior in charge of coordination between the two basic behaviors.
Given that by using ALECSYS the control system of an agent can be implemented by a network of different LCSs, it is interesting to study the issue of architecture, that is the problem of designing the network that best fits some predefined class of behaviors. We have experimented with different types of architectures, that can be broadly organized in two classes:
• monolithic architectures, built by one LCS directly connected to the agent's sensors and effectors;
• distributed architectures, built by many LCSs; in this case we distinguish between two subclasses:
· flat architectures, built by more than one LCS, in which all LCSs are at "level 1", that is, directly connected to the agent's sensors and effectors;
· hierarchical architectures, built by a hierarchy of levels.
In the following, we discuss a number of possible choices.
Monolithic architectures
The simplest choice is the monolithic architecture, with only one LCS in charge of controlling the whole behavior (Figure 2.7) . If the target behavior is made up of several basic responses, there is a further choice to be made: the state of all sensors can be wrapped up in a single message (Figure 2 .7a), or distributed into a set of independent messages (Figure 2 .7b).
We call the latter case monolithic architecture with distributed input. The idea is that inputs relevant to different responses can go into distinct messages; in such a way, input messages are shorter, and the overall learning effort can be reduced. 
Flat architectures
A distributed architectures is made up of more than one LCS. If all LCSs are directly connected to the agent's sensors, then we use the term flat architecture (Figure 2 .8). The idea is that distinct LCSs implement the different basic responses that make up a complex behavior pattern. There is a further issue, here, regarding the way in which the agent's response is built up from the moves proposed by the distinct LCSs. If such moves are independent, they can be realized by different effectors at the same time ( Figure 2 .8a); those moves that are not independent, however, have to be integrated into a single response before they are realized (Figure 2 .8b). 
Hierarchical architectures
In a flat architecture, all LCSs receive input only from the sensors. In a hierarchical architecture, the set of all LCSs can be partitioned into a number of levels. The problem of deciding what to do with the output of LCSs is more complex. In general, the output messages from the lower levels go to higher-level LCSs, while the output messages from the higher levels can go directly to the effectors to produce the response (see Figure  2 .9a), or be used to control the composition of responses proposed by lower LCSs (see Figure  2 .9b). How to compose responses of basic and coordination behaviors is an important aspect to be considered when using hierarchical architectures: different coordination mechanisms can give raise to different overall system behaviors. In our experiments we have studied the following composition mechanisms.
• Independent sum: two or more independent responses are produced at the same time; for example, an agent may emit a signal while escaping from a predator. The independent sum of behavior α and behavior β is written as: α | β.
• Combination: two or more homogeneous responses are combined into a resulting behavior; for example, an agent could escape from a predator and at the same time avoid obstacles. The combination of α and β is written as: α + β.
• Suppression: a response suppresses a competing one; for example, the agent may give up chasing a prey in order to escape from a predator. If α suppresses β, we write:
• Sequence: a behavioral pattern is built as a sequence of simpler responses; for example, fetching an object involves reaching the object, grasping it, and coming back. The sequence of α and β is written:
moreover, if a sequence σ is repeated forever, we write: σ*.
Most of the experiments presented in this article were carried out using the suppression composition rule: we call the resulting hierarchical systems switch architectures. In Figure  2 .10 we show an example of a three-level switch architecture. Another important aspect in the use of a distributed system, either flat or hierarchical, is the problem of selecting a shaping policy, that is, the order in which the various tasks are to be learned. We identified two extreme choices: holistic shaping and modular shaping.
• Holistic shaping. In holistic shaping the whole learning system is considered as a black box. The actual behavior of a single learning classifier system is not used to evaluate how to distribute reinforcements; when the system receives a reinforcement, it is given to all of the LCSs comprising the architecture. This can make the learning task difficult because there can be ambiguous situations in which the trainer cannot give the correct reinforcement to the component LCSs. A first example of ambiguous situation is when a correct action is the result of two wrong messages. Another example is when a LCS gets a punishment because of a mistake another LCS made.
• Modular shaping. In modular shaping each LCS is trained with a different reinforcement program, which takes into account the characteristics of the task that the considered LCS has to learn. We have found that a good way to implement modular shaping is to first train the basic LCSs, and then, after they have reached a good performance level, to freeze them (i.e., basic LCSs are no longer learning, but only performing) and to start training upper level LCSs. Training of basic LCSs is usually done in a separate session (in which training of basic LCSs can be run in parallel).
Experiments
Here we shall only sketch the experiments we have carried out with our robots. The interested reader will be referred to more specific papers for details.
The AutonoMice
We trained AutonoMouse II to approach a light source. After a few successful experiments carried out under "normal conditions", we designed and carried out a number of experiments to assess the robot's behavior in degraded situations (Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994b; Dorigo, 1995) , namely: robot with inverted eyes; robot with inverted motors; robot with one blind eye; robot with one badly regulated motor. The interesting results are that:
• Behavior does not suffer from inverting either eyes or motors. This is due to the fact that stimulus-response connections derive only from the learning activity, and no model of the robot's architecture is prewired into the controller. "Right" and "left" do not have any meaning other than the one which is directly assigned through the robot's own experience.
• With one blind eye, AutonoMouse II was still able to learn to approach the light, even if its performance was lower than that obtained under normal conditions. This shows that the agent is able to adapt to abnormal operating conditions.
• Analogously, the robot was still able to learn to approach the light when one of its motors was badly regulated (for example, made unable to move backwards). Again, this shows the capacity of the learning system to adapt the agent's behavior to abnormal conditions.
AutonoMouse V was mainly employed in experiments on tasks requiring the integration of different sensors, which was tested in an experiment on finding a hidden light source (see Figure 2 .11) (Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994a; Colombetti, Dorigo & Borghi, 1996) . The environment consisted of a large room containing an opaque wall, about 50 x 50 cm, and an ordinary lamp (50 W). The wall was realized as a pleated surface, in order to reflect back the sonar's beam coming from a wide range of directions. The input from the sonar was defined in such a way that a front obstacle was detected within about 1.5 m from the robot. 
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AutonoMouse V was trained to carry out its task according to different strategies. The most successful included using the sonar to approach the wall until the whiskers could sense it, then using whiskers to follow it and turn around one of its edges until the eyes could sense the light. This experiment showed that a fairly complex behavior can be achieved by directly training a real robot, without resorting to simulation.
HAMSTER
HAMSTER's task was to hoard "food" bringing it to its "nest" 3 (Colombetti, Dorigo & Borghi, 1996) , Its chief features are that it combines innate (i.e., prewired) and learned behaviors, and that training was carried out in a simulated environment and then transferred to the physical robot. The environment was a room of size 14 × 13.3 m, with various obstacles (see Figure 2 .12). Each piece of food was a cylinder (diameter 30 cm, height 70 cm) free to slide on the floor when pushed by HAMSTER, and the nest was located in a corner of the room. The food cylinders were wrapped into violet paper, and the nest's position was marked by another cylinder (diameter 30 cm, height 130 cm) wrapped in pink paper. HAMSTER used a frontal color camera to identify the position of food cylinders and of the nest, which are distinguished on the basis of color. Moreover, the nest sensor exploited an odometer (i.e., a sensor that estimates the robot's position and heading), to approximately identify the position of the nest when this was not visible. Using the notation introduced in Section 2.2.3, the target behavior can be decomposed as follows: A main concern of the HAMSTER project was to combine learned and innate behavior modules. We chose to program AvoidObstacles directly, implementing a potential-based avoidance mechanism exploiting Robuter's sonars (see for example Latombe, 1991) . The remaining part of the hoarding behavior was learned in an obstacle-free simulated environment, and then transferred to the physical robot.
We adopted a hierarchical controller architecture, with four behavioral modules at level 1, and a coordinator module at level 2. Each level-1 module proposes a direction for the robot's movement. The coordinator chooses one of the moves proposed by LeaveNest, GetFood, and ReachNest on the basis of the current situation, which is then combined with the move proposed by AvoidObstacles (see Figure 2 .13). In general, this combination amounts to some kind of vector sum of the moves proposed by AvoidObstacles and by the rest of the system. There is, however, a more complex case. When HAMSTER is nearing a piece of food, the front part of the AvoidObstacle behavior has to be inhibited, otherwise the food could never be captured. Inhibiting obstacle avoidance in such cases is part of the coordinator's task.
HAMSTER was trained through a modular shaping policy: that is, each learned level-1 module was trained separately, and then frozen. The Coordinator was then trained to achieve the target behavior. We then transferred the controller onto the real robot, and ran some successful experiments in the real environment (with obstacles). The HAMSTER project shows that it is feasible to implement a robot's controller starting from both innate and learned behavioral modules. 
CRAB
The experiment we have carried out with CRAB was intended to establish whether the light following task successfully learnt by AutonoMouse II could also be learned by a robot with a completely different geometry (Patel, Colombetti & Dorigo, 1995) . In fact, reaching for an object by a mobile robot or by a manipulator are two different behaviors, because they require the two agents to perform different actions to achieve similar results. Consider for example the two configurations, a and b, shown in Figure 2 .14. To move the end effector P forward in configuration a, the agent has to rotate link 1 right, and link 2 left; in configuration b, link 1 has to be rotated left, and link 2 right. This problem is typical of the polar geometry of a manipulator, and does not arise with mobile robots like the AutonoMice. CRAB'S task was to reach a still infrared emitter by its end effector. The emitter was placed in a subarea of the manipulator's workspace (the light gray area in Figure 2 .5), and was randomly displaced each time CRAB reached it. The first problem we had to solve was in which position to place infrared sensors on the robot's arm. Using simulations, we found that such a choice was indeed critical for the agent to learn the task. A number of experiments allowed us to choose the following sensor configuration:
• an infrared light sensor placed on the end effector, able to detect in which of eight equal sectors the infrared emitter was placed;
• a proprioceptive sensor on the elbow, able to detect whether the second link formed, with respect to the first link, an angle between 0 and 80 degrees, or between 81 and 160 degrees.
With such a sensor equipment, CRAB was able to learn the light approaching behavior. To cut down learning time, we trained the real robot starting from an LCS initialized with the result of a learning session carried out in simulation. In fact, CRAB proved able to exploit such an initial state, and did improve its performance as a result of additional learning in the real environment.
Conclusions
As a whole, we believe we have proved that our evolutionary-based learning system, ALECSYS, is able to support learning of interesting behaviors by artificial agents acting in the real environment. The use of distributed, and in particular hierarchic, architectures allowed us to achieve fairly complex behaviors, that would have been hard to learn in a monolithic system. However, we feel that our agents are very "rigid", in particular if compared with even the simplest natural organisms. In fact, in ALECSYS architecture has to be designed, and cannot be altered as an effect of evolution. Moreover, to achieve efficient learning the interaction among behavioral modules must be kept very simple, and this limits the variety and complexity of the behaviors that our agents can display.
Of course, it would be possible to implement a more powerful version of ALECSYS, in order to experiment with more complex behaviors; but we feel that such a work would not enrich our knowledge in important ways. As we shall argue in the following sections, major improvements in the complexity of agents probably call for a major change in the whole approach to agent development: less responsibility should be placed on the agent designer, and more on the process of spontaneous adaptation to the environment. We shall return to this important point in Section 5.
Agents and their Qualities
In this section, we first propose a general definition of agent. Then, we try to characterize the objects contained in the agent's environment in functional terms, analyzing the types of interaction between the agent and such objects.
Agents defined
Intuitively, an agent, Ag, is a dynamic system connected through a feedback loop with another dynamic system, called the external environment, EE (Fig. 3.1) . It doesn't take much to realize that this definition is insufficient, because almost any dynamic system becomes an agent under such a characterization. Clearly, the definition must be refined. We first notice that the relationship between the agent and its environment is not symmetrical. While all the agent's input comes from the external environment, and all the agent's output goes to the external environment, we cannot assume the reverse. In fact, there are outputs from EE that are not input to Ag, and inputs to EE that do not come from Ag. This is reflected in the scheme of Figure 3 .2. We therefore rephrase our definition: an agent is a dynamic system connected through a feedback loop with another dynamic system, called the external environment, which for the agent is both partially uncontrollable and partially unobservable. This definition suggests that the agent can be regarded as a system controlling its external environment. However, this view is still too rough. An agent is made up of a "body", that we shall call the agent's shell, Sh, and by a "mind", the agent's controller, C. The controller collects information through sensors, S, and sends out information to the agent's actuators, A, which in turn produce behavior.
It is important to note that in general sensory information is not relative to the external environment alone, but to the interaction between the agent's shell and the external environment. For example, the light intensity sensors of AutonoMouse are not directly sensitive to the intensity of the light source, but rather to a complex function of the light source intensity, of the distance between the source and the sensors, and of the medium between the light source and the sensors. Analogously, the actuators do not directly change the external environment, but rather cause an interaction between the shell and the external environment: motors do not immediately displace the agent, but cause wheels to turn, and the agent moves as a result of the interaction between the wheels and the floor. We conclude that the controller controls the interaction between the agent's shell and the external environment (Fig. 3.3) ; such interaction is what we call the agent's behavior. Sensors collect information which is both incomplete and noisy: incomplete, because not all aspects of behavior are accessible to the controller through the agent's sensors; noisy, because real sensors are inaccurate. Moreover, the interaction between the shell and the external environment cannot be completely controlled, because of two reasons: (i) actuators are noisy; and (ii) the external environment is subject to its own dynamics, independently of the agent's actions (for instance, in the AutonoMouse experiments the light was at times moved by the experimenter).
The functional characterization of environmental objects
Our agents are animat-like robots (see Wilson, 1987 ) that carry out their activity in environments containing nests, obstacles, preys, hurting objects, etc. In most cases, the behavioral patterns exhibited by our agents are instances of tactic behavior, that is, they are directed at approaching, reaching, avoiding or fleeing from objects (taxis). Even if the class of tactic behavior is rather limited, it provides interesting problems for agent development, especially if we consider possible interactions between the agent and the objects when the agent comes to contact with them.
Terms like "nest" or "prey" obviously convey a zoomorphic metaphor. However, they can be defined at an abstract level in terms of the agent's behavior. Tactic objects (i.e., environmental objects involved in an agent's tactic behavior) can be classified according to a number of dimensions:
• The appetitive dimension: tactic objects can be attractors or repellors, with obvious meaning.
• The locality dimension: a tactic object is local if its attraction (repulsion) on the agent's behavior depends on the distance between the agent and the object, and it is global otherwise.
• The geometrical dimension: a tactic object is point-shaped if its center of attraction or repulsion is a geometrical point, and is extended otherwise.
• The cinematic dimension: a tactic object can be still or moving.
In our experiments, what we metaphorically call a prey is a moving, point-shaped global attractor; a predator is a moving, typically global point-shaped repellor; an obstacle is a typically still, extended local repellor, and so on. In fact, the tactic aspect of an object does not completely characterize the agent's behavior with respect to it. Compare for example a food patch and the agent's nest. From the tactic point of view, both objects can be regarded as still, extended global attractors. The difference between the two is functional: nests are used to find shelter, and food is either eaten on the spot or hoarded.
In general, artificial agents interact with objects in a much simpler way than complex animals. Typically, a robot will grasp, drop or push certain types of objects (like preys or food pieces), and will enter or leave other types of objects (like nests). We therefore classify objects functionally according to two more dimensions:
• The manipulation dimension: some objects can be grasped and dropped, other objects can be pushed.
• The topological dimension: some objects can be entered and left.
A physical object need not maintain its features unaltered in time. For example, a predator is a repellor only if the agent is not in its nest; moreover, the presence of a predator typically turns the nest into an attractor. The functional characterization of objects is therefore dependent on the current motivational state of the agent. So far, we have considered motivations as just a type of agent's state (see Colombetti & Dorigo, 1994; Dorigo & Colombetti, 1994a) . As our agents become more complex, however, we expect that the motivational aspects of behavior will be increasingly important and will deserve special treatment (see Section 5).
The previous analysis shows that the interdependence between the agent and its environment is indeed very tight: properties and capacities are not intrinsic, but relational. For example: no object is an obstacle per se: being an obstacle for an agent means being avoided by that agent; and the ability to manipulate is not just a property of the agent, but a property of the coupling between the agent and certain types of objects. Behavior Engineering, therefore, is not really concerned with the development of agents, but rather with the development of complex systems, of which agents are just a component.
The Natural and the Artificial
We must now ask the following question: why does an agent produce behavior? A common answer would be: to pursue its goals. However, the very concept of goal is highly ambiguous. What are the goals of animals? Is a robot acting to pursue its own goals or the goals of its designer? In fact, we believe that goals should be attributed only to those agents that can literally be said to have them. Human beings certainly have goals, and (at least sometimes) act according to plans produced in order to achieve them. Most probably, higher level animals, like primates and other mammals, do have mental states like beliefs and goals (Griffin, 1984; Prato Previde et al., 1992) . However, it is likely that lower level animals do not have mental states properly so called, and this is certainly the case for current artificial systems (for a philosophical argument, see Searle, 1992) .
Darwin has taught us how to avoid teleological arguments in the analysis of living systems: organisms that undergo natural selection show features that tend to maximize their fitness, that is, their capacity to spread their own genetic makeup. As far as it is genetically determined, an aspect of animal behavior should therefore be explained in terms of its adaptive value, defined as its contribution to the overall fitness of the organism. As shown by contemporary ethology (see for example McFarland, 1981) , this approach to the explanation of behavior is extremely powerful and productive. 4 Clearly, we cannot apply the same line of thought to the analysis of artificial agents: robots are the result of explicit design, not of natural selection. Even when the agent controller is developed through evolutionary methods, we shall argue in the next section, strict Darwinian explanations do not apply. In fact, we cannot forget that a robot is designed to carry out a predefined task, that we shall call its target behavior. Typically, the target behavior is part of the initial requirements that a robot designer has to fulfill (see Colombetti, Dorigo & Borghi, 1996) . So, it seems that we cannot immediately exploit the biological notion of fitness to formulate basic laws governing artificial agents.
Not only scientists have been intrigued by the problems connected with the basic laws of artificial behavior. In his celebrated collection of short stories, I, Robot, Isaac Asimov (1950) puts forward the Three Laws of Robotics, 5 claiming to quote them from the Handbook of Robotics, 56th edition, 2058 A.D.:
1. A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
Does all this have anything to do with real robotics in 1995? The first part of the First Law is certainly a wise design criterion, as far as injures to human beings and other accidents can be practically avoided through concern for safety (so far, nobody can cope with the second part). The Second Law assumes that robots can understand human orders; a weaker but more realistic version could be:
2'. A robot must carry out its target behavior, provided the given safety conditions are met.
Also the Third Law has concrete interest, in that an agent can carry out its task only as far as it survives. 6 We can therefore propose our version of this law:
3'. A robot must survive and work properly at least until it has accomplished its task.
We can now compare robots and living organisms. Animals do not have any predefined "task"; rather, they strive to spread their genetic makeup. However, to do so animals must survive. To enforce a parallel between robots and animals, we can compare a robot's target behavior with the biological function of maximizing one's offspring. While these two concepts are different, they both involve survival as a necessary condition: Survival then appears to be an important common feature of artificial and natural agents. We believe that this argument allows us to clarify the concept of an autonomous agent: an artificial agent can be said to be autonomous if it is able to survive in its environment while carrying out its target behavior. We can know ask ourselves whether it is suitable to apply the notion of fitness to artificial agents. A first option is to redefine fitness as the ability to survive: in this case it would certainly apply to robots. However, we feel that the concept of fitness retains all its explicatory power only in the context of an evolutionary process; therefore, we postpone its discussion to the next two sections.
There is certainly a metaphoric way of interpreting the fitness of an artifact in terms of its ability to "maximize its offspring". Commercial robots as Robosoft's Robuter (Robosoft SA, 1991) and Lausanne Polytechnic's Khepera (Mondada, Franzi & Ienne, 1994) show high fitness, in that they are spreading through robotics labs. In a less metaphoric way, we would probably interpret this as a consequence of the overall quality of such robots. Talking of artifacts, and in particular of industrial products, quality is probably the correct counterpart of biological fitness. How are we going to define, and hopefully measure, the quality of an artificial agent?
The quality of an artificial agent
In general, the quality of a product is made up of different components. As far as agents are concerned, the most obvious of such components is performance, that is, a measure of how efficiently the agent performs a predefined target behavior.
Another important component is robustness, understood as the capacity to perform acceptably well even if the operating conditions are different from the ones assumed during design and training. Robustness includes both graceful degradation of behavior in case of hardware and software faults, and insensitivity to limited changes in the structure and dynamics of the environment. Robustness of behavior does not presuppose any change in the agent's controller. For example, the AutonoMice trained to approach a steady light were still able to approach it if it started moving (see Dorigo, 1995) . This is a consequence of the insensitivity of the controller to the motion state of the light.
Related to robustness is the concept of adaptiveness, which is understood as the robot's ability to modify itself in order to adapt to changes in the structure or the dynamics of the environment. This concept is very important for understanding agents, and so we have devoted Section 4 to its discussion. At the present stage of technology, only software components can show some degree of adaptiveness, as a result of learning mechanisms.
Many more interesting aspects of agent quality can be defined, like reliability, flexibility, efficiency, etc. We shall not pursue this line here, and shall limit our attention to the three components defined above.
The quality of an agent should be evaluated in quantitative terms. This is relatively easy for performance. In our experiments we have adopted two types of performance indexes:
• Local performance indexes (or learning indexes), that measure the effectiveness of the learning process (that is, the correspondence between what is taught and what is learned).
• Global performance indexes, that measure the correspondence of the robot's behaviors with the target behavior.
In general, we define local performance as the ratio of "correct" actions to the total number of actions performed over a predefined time interval; actions are considered correct if they are rewarded by the trainer. The definition of global performance, on the other hand, strictly depends on the specific target behavior; for a food hoarding task, for instance, such a measure might be defined as the number of food pieces collected and brought to the nest on a predefined time interval. In fact, the problem of defining performance can be dealt with in a fairly general way within the reinforcement learning paradigm. For ease of explanation, let us consider a very simple example: a mobile robot whose target behavior is to reach and touch a moving light as many times as possible. For any time instant t, the agent's global performance G(t) can be measured as
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where result(t) is 1 if the robot touches the light at instant t, and 0 otherwise. The function G(t) can be used to specify the robot's target behavior: for example, we might say that the value G(t) must be as large as possible, and in any case greater than a predefined threshold. If the robot is trained through a delayed reinforcement method, it will typically receive a reward each time it touches the light. However, if immediate reinforcement is used, like in our experiments, the robot will not be trained to touch the light, but rather to approach it; this is feasible, because we know that a moving agent will finally touch an object that it steadily approaches. With reference to the light-approaching behavior, we can define a local performance function l(t) as
which measures the decrease of distance between the robot and the light as a result of the robot's action at instant t. In principle, the function l(t) can be used to compute the reinforcement r(t) to be assigned at instant t:
In practice, however, reinforcements often do not coincide with a measure of local performance, but are only related to it. We have empirically found that in general learning is sped up if poor performance is punished and good performance is strongly rewarded. In any case, the function ρ relating reinforcement to local performance,
must be an increasing function; 7 in other words, better performance must receive higher reinforcement. Typically, the ρ function might be a step function like the one depicted in Figure 3 .4. 
It is interesting to note that the three functions G(t), l(t) and r(t) provide three different views of the agent's performance. To allow for a comparison, let us define two cumulative functions associated to l and r: The three points of view are obviously related, but they do not coincide. In fact, it is possible to have high values of L and low values of G: this means that the robot designer did a poor job, and decided to realize the global target behavior through local behaviors that actually do not guarantee success (for example, following a mouse would be a very poor strategy to catch it -traps are much more effective). In turn, high values of R tell us that the agent is learning what the reinforcements tell it to do; but reinforcements might tell the wrong thing. For example, the trainer might erroneously reward the agent of our example when it does not approach the light: in this case we would have a high value of R and a low value for G at the same time. We conclude that the three function G, L and R are all necessary for an adequate evaluation of the agent's performance.
Performance is not the only quality aspect that one would like to measure. The functions we have previously analyzed also tell us about the agent's adaptiveness: the increase of performance over time, as an effect of learning, is in fact a sign that the agent has adaptive capacities. In particular, the experiments reported about AutonoMouse II can be viewed as an inquiry in the adaptive capacities of LCS-based agents.
On the contrary, we performed very few experiments to study the robustness of our agents. In the context of our research, an agent would be robust if it were capable of keeping a high level of performance in presence of changes in the agent-environment interaction, without resorting to learning. In other words: while adaptiveness is an effect of learning, robustnessif present -would be a result of the agent's architecture (and in particular of the learned behavioral modules).
Certainly, LCS have some intrinsic robustness, in particular as an effect of their redundancy: learned behavior modules are not minimal, and code the same behavioral rule in several copies and in several versions. For example, an agent that in a given situation has to move forward will learn to do so, but will also learn that turning slightly right or slightly left is not too bad. Such suboptimal rules would turn out to be very useful in cases in which moving straight ahead is physically impossible.
The agent's architecture and its learning capacities thus appear to bear the fundamental responsibility for the agent's quality. Much more research in both directions will have to be done before really high-quality artificial agents can be realized.
The Concept of Adaptiveness
Literally speaking, "adaptive" means "capable of adaptation". Contrary to the term "adaptable", which has both active and passive acceptations (meaning both "able to adapt" and "able to be adapted"), "adaptive" has an inherent active flavor: for example, an adaptive controller would be one that can tune its parameters on line to control a time-variant process.
Biologists distinguish among different kinds of adaptation. 8 The two kinds which are relevant for us here are evolutionary (or philogenetic) adaptation, concerning the way in which species adjust to environmental conditions through evolution, and ontogenetic adaptation, that is, the process by which an individual adjusts to its environment during its lifetime. As far as behavior is concerned, ontogenetic adaptation is a result of learning.
Let us first analyze evolutionary adaptation. Many researchers, including us, have shown that evolutionary computation is a suitable paradigm to develop the behavior of artificial agents. In practical applications, in fact, artificial evolution mingles with individual learning, in that "reproduction" only occurs at the software level; evolutionary procedures can thus be viewed as a class of machine learning methods. What characterizes evolutionary methods is the presence of "discovery" operators, like mutation and crossover, and of a process of selection based on an evaluation of the agent's behavior. Given the analogy with natural evolution, the result of such evaluation is usually called fitness.
According to the approach adopted, fitness can apply to different entities: to the whole behavior exhibited by the agent, to a single behavior module, or to a highly specific behavior rule. In all cases, however, fitness will always be a function of the actual behavior produced by the agent in its environment.
In the realm of organisms, we say that an individual has high fitness if it is highly effective in spreading its offspring; that the world is mainly inhabited by organisms with high fitness is therefore almost tautological. The interesting problem for biologists is then to find out which features of the individual essentially contribute to its overall fitness (or, in other words, which features have high adaptive value).
In the realm of artificial agents, the relationship between fitness and reproductive success is reversed: first, the fitness of an individual is computed as a function of its interaction with the environment; second, the fittest individuals are caused to reproduce. However, this pattern is not exclusive of artificial systems: it is applied by breeders (of cattle, horses, dogs, etc.) to produce breeds with predefined features.
In fact, we contend that the best metaphor of evolutionary computation is not biological evolution, but breeding. This change of perspective is not without consequences. For example, it is typical of breeding that highly disadaptive features can be selected: The survival of pure-breed animals is often more problematic than that of mongrels. Analogously, applying evolutionary methods to the development of task-oriented behavior may easily result into a robot with low survival capacity. In both animal breeding and evolutionary robotics, the fault is not in the evolutionary method itself; rather, it stems from the definition of a fitness function which is not enough comprehensive. This suggests that, as far as possible, the fitness function used to develop robot behavior should take into account the overall quality of the agent, and not performance alone -confirming our previous intuition that quality is the artificial counterpart of biological fitness.
An important difference between the natural and the artificial is that in animals learning is sharply different from evolution. Moreover, the capacity of individual learning in organisms is itself a product of evolution; we must therefore expect to find such a capacity where it has adaptive value. In the realm of the artificial, on the contrary, there is no sharp conceptual separation between individual learning and evolution. In our experiments, for example, we have implemented individual learning of new behaviors in term of the evolution of a population of behavior rules: the ontogenetic adaptation of our agents is actually the result of a process of "filogenetic adaptation" taking place at a finer grain size.
Machine learning techniques can achieve adaptation in two basically different ways, that we can respectively call parameter setting and structural learning. In ALECSYS, for example, the Bucket Brigade algorithm is used to compute classifier strength (parameter setting), and GA is used to create new classifiers (structural learning). Many well-known learning algorithms, like Back-propagation and Simulated Annealing, can only be used for parameter setting. On the contrary evolutionary computation methods, like GAs, are widely used both for parameter setting and for structural learning.
There is no doubt that automatic parameter setting methods are going to be useful, if not essential, for developing artificial agents, because agents will have to adapt to a world that designers can model only with some approximation. To this purpose, a variety of known learning methods can be used, including evolutionary strategies.
The most stimulating applications of evolutionary strategies, however, are the ones intended to bring about new structures, like behavior rules, neural network topologies, articulation of a system into modules, etc. In the following, we shall direct our attention to such applications.
The Evolutionary Development of Artificial Agents
From the point of view of structural design, the main interest of evolutionary computation is that it allows us to deal with a larger design space. If we dub rational design the conceptual space that is searched by human designers, we can say that evolutionary strategies can search in the space of nonrational design. 9 The relevant question is then: is there any practical justification to search such a space? Or, in other words: what are the limitation of rational design that we would like to overcome by enlarging the spectrum of possibilities? Before we try to answer this question, we need to characterize human design better.
We think that the main qualifying aspect of rationally designed systems is that they are modular. Modularity is what makes a complex system still easy to conceive, to understand, to modify, etc. Divide et impera is perhaps the most fundamental engineering motto.
A system is modular when it is built up from modules, that is from subsystems that are both highly cohesive and loosely coupled (see for example Ghezzi, Yazayeri & Mandrioli, 1991) . High cohesion is an intramodular property: it means that the subsystem has a wellidentified function, and contains only components that operate to realize such a function. Loose coupling is an intermodular property: it means that the complexity of the interfaces between subsystems is negligible with respect to the internal complexity of the modules.
The virtues of modularity are manifold. Modular systems are easier to understand, maintain and modify; in general, they are less prone to errors and easier to debug. It is important to note, however, that these properties are not directly related to the intrinsic performance of the system -in principle, a highly modular system may be less efficient than a less modular counterpart. The advantages of modularity concern the relationships between an artificial system and the human beings involved in its design, implementation and maintenance. It is true, however, that most artificial systems that are not modular are so because they have grown in a chaotic way, and thus they often behave rather poorly.
According to classical engineering methodologies, lack of modularity is to be avoided. As regards Nature, there is often sharp disagreement as to how modular biological systems are (see for example Fodor, 1985) . Clearly, nobody wants to claim that natural systems show no articulation in subsystems. However, such subsystems do not seem to be structured in a modular way (at least under the definition of module that we gave above): it is almost commonplace that living organisms tend to act as a whole, and this implies very strong coupling among subsystems, and thus a low degree of modularity.
Given our previous considerations, the lack of modularity of natural systems is easy to understand. As we have remarked, modularity does not directly improve performance, but it affects the relationship between artificial systems and humans. Clearly, Nature optimizes fitness, not understandability by humans! Observing natural systems, it seems reasonable to assume, at least as a working hypotheses, that their high degree of fitness might profit from their nonmodular organization. Now, two very important questions must be asked. To which extent is nonmodular design an interesting option for the development of artificial systems? And how can nonmodular systems actually be designed and implemented?
That a high degree of modularity is not always a right (or possible) choice can be clearly seen by analyzing AI programs. In fact much of AI, and in particular Knowledge Engineering, could be viewed as the engineering of low-modularity software systems. Consider for example the programming paradigm of production systems: the interactions among production rules in any large production system are strong and, as any AI programmer knows, often difficult to control. That the royal road of modularity is abandoned mainly by those who aim at building "intelligent" systems is indeed an interesting fact.
Even if nonmodular systems can be very effective, to work properly they have to solve a number of hard problems. In our opinion, these are the main ones:
• Problems with input information. While modular systems implement a rational preselection of useful input, nonmodular systems often have to deal with highly redundant input information.
• Problems of interference among subsystems. In nonmodular systems, the interaction among subsystems can be very complex. This may lead to useful emergent properties, but also to improper behavior.
• Problems of action focusing. Nonmodular systems may find it difficult to focus their action in a coherent way.
If this is true, we should be able to identify specific solutions to these problems in natural agents. In our opinion, this is precisely the role of such important biological mechanisms as attention, inhibition, and motivation: the role of attention is to deal with highly redundant input information; of inhibition, to solve conflicts arising from interference among subsystems; of motivation, to focus the system's activity toward specific goals. In modular systems, these mechanisms are relatively marginal. In fact, attention, inhibition and motivation are not recognized as important architectural concepts in traditional software design. However, complex concurrent system do make use of mechanisms, like interrupts, that are clearly related to inhibition; moreover, inhibition plays a fundamental role in the subsumption architecture, proposed by Brooks (1991) as a basis for behavior based robotics.
Again, it is interesting to look at production systems which, as we have already remarked, have a low degree of modularity. Production systems of the OPS5-type (Brownston et al., 1985) indeed deal with the problems we have pointed out. For example, the "recency principle" can be viewed as a mechanism to focus the interpreter's attention toward recently acquired information; inhibition among production instances is virtually implemented in the selection strategies applied to the conflict set; and context based metaprogramming is analogous to a motivation mechanism.
However, examples of nonmodular artificial systems are the exception, and not the rule. In spite of many interesting ideas from AI, the divide et impera strategy has strong and valid rationality motivations. Is there any concrete need to depart from such a principle?
In fact, we cannot always be rational. Rationality presupposes knowledge: where we do not know enough, no rational methodology can lead us to make the right decisions. And the development of an autonomous agent is a striking example of a case where we do not know enough: the real world is too complex and unpredictable to allow for exhaustive modeling. So far, we have experimented with very simple agents in fairly stable environments, and therefore we have been allowed to put enough rationality in the design of our robots. But the analysis carried out in this paper leads us to expect that such an approach cannot scale up to really complex agents interacting with natural environments.
Of course, we have also to keep in mind that a methodology for BE must be technologically feasible. Evolutionary computation is highly time consuming; given that physical robots move rather slowly, to save time it should be carried out in simulated environments as far as possible. On the other hand, strong adaptation to a real environment can only be achieved in the environment itself, given that simulations environments are too idealized. This dilemma must be solved in order to work out a feasible engineering methodology.
One possible way out, that we intend to pursue in the near future, is to develop artificial agents in simulated environments as far as possible, and then to refine them by additional learning and/or evolution in the real world. In fact, we have already applied this methodology with some success, for example in the CRAB experiment. How far this approach can be pushed is however an open research issue.
Conclusions
In this paper we have briefly sketched our previous experience with the evolutionary development of artificial agents. We have then tried to reflect on such experience, drawing some conclusions and suggesting directions for future research.
Artificial agents participate of a double nature. As artificial systems, they have to be designed and built by human beings; as agents that must survive in a natural environment, they are close relatives of animals. Therefore, Behavior Engineers will have to produce a new synthesis of two realms, the one of Nature and the one of the Artificial, which are still far apart.
In the last fifteen years or so, models and technologies inspired by biological processes have received increasing attention. It seems to us that evolutionary computation in particular M. Colombetti, M. Dorigo
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might open a full new range of possibilities for the designs of complex artifacts, and of artificial agents in particular.
